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1 Introduction
It is now widely acknowledged that the decision to evade taxes is not only driven by
extrinsic, pecuniary factors (such as tax rates, penalties, audit probabilities and enforce-
ment) but also by intrinsic, non-pecuniary motives.1 Following Luttmer and Singhal
(2014), we use the term tax morale as an umbrella term for such intrinsic tax-compliance
motives.2 While tax morale is shaped by many factors (such as guilt, preferences for
honesty, moral sentiments and cultural factors), social norms and reciprocity are often
believed to be key determinants.3 Reciprocity in this context means that the motivation
to comply may depend on the (perceived) quality of government services which citizens
receive in return for their tax payments (this is also related to the concept of conditional
cooperation; see Frey and Meier 2004). Social norms of tax-compliance behavior particu-
larly depend on the perception about the prevalence of tax evasion in society. Taxpayers
might be more willing to evade if (they have the impression that) evasion is very common,
and they might be more compliant if (they believe that) most other taxpayers pay their
taxes honestly. In this paper, we present the first randomized survey experiment in the
context of tax compliance to assess the role of social norms and reciprocity for shaping
tax morale. In addition, we shed new light on the anatomy of tax morale.
The survey experiment is embedded in the German Internet Panel (GIP), a repre-
sentative online survey in Germany. We included the following question measuring tax
morale in the GIP: ’How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes if an easy opportunity
to do so presents itself? ’. The formulation of the question is similar to the one used in
the World Values Survey (WVS) which is widely used in the tax-compliance literature
(see, e.g., Slemrod 2003, Alm and Torgler 2006). It creates a hypothetical situation in
which taxpayers have an ’easy opportunity’ to evade and it does not ask participants
about their actual tax-compliance behavior. There is also evidence indicating that the
replies to the corresponding question in the WVS are indeed linked with actual levels of
tax evasion (Halla 2012).
Before responding to this question, participants were randomly assigned to three ex-
perimental groups. First, the question is preceded only by a general note that issues of tax
1Dwenger et al. (2016), for example, provide evidence that a significant fraction of individuals comply
with taxes even in the absence of any deterrence (i.e., in the absence of any penalties or audits). DeBacker
et al. (2015) study a situation in which taxpayers differ in their level of intrinsic motivation but operate in
the same deterrence environment. They provide evidence that taxpayers with lower intrinsic motivations
indeed are less compliant. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) mentions ’socio-political’ factors
as primary drivers of tax compliance (IRS 2007). Luttmer and Singhal (2014) provide a survey and
summarize the role of non-pecuniary motives and intrinsic motivations on actual compliance in detail.
2Dwenger et al. (2016) use the term intrinsic motivations for tax compliance while other papers use
tax ethics or tax honesty to describe what we label tax morale.
3Luttmer and Singhal (2014) provide a typology of tax-morale mechanisms in which they classify
social norms and reciprocity to be key drivers of tax morale. Their definitions of these concepts is
congruent with our following definitions.
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evasion are often discussed in the media. We label this group the ’control group’. Second,
in addition to this general note, participants are informed that scientific studies estimate
the tax gap in industrialized countries to be approximately 10%.4 This experimental
variation intends to manipulate the social norm of tax evasion by providing information
about the level of tax evasion in the population. We label this group the ’social-norm
group’. Third, in addition to the information in the social-norm group, participants are
informed that the government expenses for education in Germany could be increased by
approximately 50% if the foregone revenue that is due to the tax gap would be spent
on education. This variation adds a reciprocity component as it increases awareness and
salience about the relationship between evaded taxes and government expenditures and
services. It refers to the specific example of education expenditures, which are likely
to be perceived as beneficial for society in general and maybe also for an individual in
particular. Hence, by adding the potentially bad consequences of non-compliance, this
treatment confronts the survey participants with the social externalities of tax evasion.
We label this group the ’reciprocity group’. All information provided in the treatments
were not deceptive (see Section 2 for a validation and justification of information and
numbers referenced in the experimental treatments).
We find the following main results in our randomized survey experiment. First,
manipulating the social norm through information about the general extent of tax evasion
has a negative effect on tax morale, relative to the control group. This is in line with
literature in other contexts (see below) and confirms that social norms can backfire if
they reveal that a certain behavior is regrettably frequent. Second, if an appeal to
reciprocity is added to the social-norm information, tax morale becomes significantly
larger. The treatment reminds participants that beneficial government services can only
be provided in return for compliance among taxpayers. Our findings suggest that such
an appeal to reciprocity works and that a backfire effect of social norms is outweighed if
the consequences of the social norm are made salient.
The treatment effects are in the range of 2-3 percentage points. Given that only 11%
of participants find tax evasion acceptable the effects are not only statistically but also
economically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects should also be considered
in light of the fact that tax morale is usually seen to be a fairly inelastic parameter which
is shaped over a lifetime through experiences as a taxpayer, perceptions of and attitudes
towards the government as well as culture (Luttmer and Singhal 2014). Furthermore,
our experimental manipulation consisted of only one or two additional sentences and was
therefore fairly minor.
4The tax gap is a common measure for the extent of tax evasion (Slemrod 2007). It is defined as
the share of outstanding taxes relative to actual (paid plus unpaid) tax liability. In order to make the
treatment message comprehensible for a general audience, we do not actually use the word ’tax gap’.
See section 2 for the exact wording of the treatment messages.
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In addition to studying the effects of the randomized survey experiment, the survey
allows us to shed new light on the anatomy of tax morale. We confirm earlier findings
on the (correlational) effects of gender and age on tax morale as women tend to have
higher tax morale and tax morale increases with age. The novelty of our paper is that
we have measures of risk aversion and patience in our survey data. We show that neither
gender nor age effects are driven by risk or patience, and additionally confirm the intuitive
expectation that risk aversion and tax morale are positively correlated. Also in line with
intuition, as well as corresponding with recent results on attitudes towards redistribution
(Alesina et al. 2018), we find that participants with right-wing political attitudes have
significantly lower tax morale.
We contribute to several strands of the literature. First, we add to the general
literature on tax evasion, and in particular to the work on intrinsic motivations for tax
compliance (in addition to the recent survey by Luttmer and Singhal 2014, the overview
article by Andreoni et al. 1998 also highlights the importance of non-pecuniary motives
for compliance). As already discussed in footnote 1 above, there is evidence that tax
morale exists and translates into actual tax-paying behavior. Such findings motivate
studies on tax morale and make them relevant.5 An earlier strand of tax-morale literature
mainly uses data from the WVS to study its correlational determinants (see e.g., Torgler
2006). These papers find that tax morale is correlated with variables such as gender
or age. We confirm these findings and add additional evidence on the anatomy of tax
morale, for example with respect to personal characteristics such as risk aversion and
patience. A particular contribution is our finding that neither gender nor age effects are
driven by risk preferences or patience.
Second, we further relate to literature on the tax-compliance effects of social norms
(compliance behavior of others) and reciprocity (highlighting the role of tax payments for
government provided services and goods), which belong to the typology of the main tax-
morale ingredients by Luttmer and Singhal (2014). Survey correlations and experimental
evidence from the laboratory support the significance of reciprocity for compliance (e.g.,
Alm and Jackson 1993; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Frey and Torgler 2007; Cummings et al.
2009; Alm 2012; Lamberton et al. 2014). Two papers using observational data and
natural experiments also suggest that government policy/approval affects compliance
and, thus, that reciprocity may matter: Cullen et al. (2018) show that government
approval has a positive effect on tax evasion,6 and Besley et al. (2015) document that
5Luttmer and Singhal (2014, page 151) also ”argue that tax morale is indeed an important component
of tax compliance decisions, though [they] view enforcement as the primary driver of compliance.”
6The paper links county-level evasion measures (based on IRS data) with a county’s political align-
ment. Political alignment is used as a proxy for government approval, where the relation between political
alignment and government approval is shown using survey data.
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the introduction of a tax that was widely perceived to be unfair increased evasion.7
However, evidence from randomized field interventions on the role of reciprocity on tax
compliance is somewhat mixed. While studies such as Blumenthal et al. (2001), Dwenger
et al. (2016), Castro and Scartascini (2015) and Bergolo et al. (2017) do not find
any significant effects of highlighting the services of the state/government, Bott et al.
(2017) and Hallsworth et al. (2017) provide evidence for a positive reciprocity effect on
compliance.
Evidence on the role of social norms for compliance is also mixed. Several field-
experimental papers do not find any compliance effects of communicating that the ma-
jority of taxpayers is compliant with the law (e.g., Blumenthal et al. 2001; Fellner et al.
2013; Dwenger et al. 2016; Castro and Scartascini 2015; Perez-Truglia and Troiano 2015).
In contrast to these null findings, other studies do find effects of social norms on compli-
ance behavior. Hallsworth et al. (2017) document in a randomized setting that telling
taxpayers that ’9 out of 10 people (in the UK) pay their taxes on time’ increases punctual
payment of tax debt. Paetzold and Winner (2016) show that taxpayers evade more taxes
after they change jobs to a firm where evasion is more common than in their previous
firm – this also suggests that social norms and the behavior of others matter for tax
compliance.8
In light of these mixed findings in the compliance literature, our paper adds new
evidence on the role of social norms and reciprocity for tax compliance. While several
recent studies use randomized variation in the field and look at reported tax bases as
outcome variables, we implement a randomized survey experiment with a focus on survey-
reported tax morale. One particular advantage of conducting a survey experiment is that
we are able to study social norms and reciprocity within the same design and compare
their relative importance for tax morale (which is difficult in a field experiment). In
contrast to field experiments, the survey experiment further allows us to examine attitudes
towards evasion (rather than actual behavior), which might be more elastic to small
interventions than actual tax payments that involve large stakes. As a result, the survey
experiment could be used to identify possible effects of social norms and reciprocity in
the context of compliance which cannot be identified in a field experiment. This relates
to the argument by Luttmer and Singhal (2014) that null findings of moral appeals in
compliance experiments should be attributed to the lack of power of the interventions
7Falkinger (1988) presents a theoretical model in which taxpayers value the shares of public goods
that they receive. Congdon et al. (2009) stress in their overview article that it likely matters for tax
behavior what people believe their taxes are used for. Additional empirical work is Cebula (2013) who
shows a positive relation between IRS measures of aggregate tax evasion and government satisfaction.
8In line with this empirical evidence on the existence of social norms, Traxler (2010) incorporates
social norms into the standard Allingham and Sandmo (1972)-model and models them as depending on
the tax-compliance behavior of other citizens (whereby more evaders in the society increase the individual
willingness to evade). Fortin et al. (2007), Chetty et al. (2013) and Bohne and Nimczik (2018) are further
examples from tax-related contexts showing that the behavior of other people affects individual behavior.
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rather than suggesting that moral appeals do not matter. The small interventions in our
survey experiment potentially have enough power to manipulate attitudes towards tax
evasion (while similar interventions in the field are not sufficiently powerful to shift actual
behavior).9
Third, our paper relates to the extensive literature on social norms and reciprocity
in other (non-tax) contexts. For example, the literature on public goods – where con-
tributing to the public good can be interpreted as the equivalent choice to paying taxes
honestly – has shown that people contribute more to the public good the more others
contribute (e.g., Weimann 1994, Keser and Van Winden 2000) and the more they expect
in return for contributing to the public good (e.g. Zelmer 2003). That is, social norms
and reciprocity seem to matter for public-good provision. The literature strands on char-
itable giving and pro-environmental behavior also show that social norms and reciprocity
matter and that they increase the likelihood of choosing the desired ’more moral’ options
such as higher donations or saving more energy (e.g. Andreoni and Scholz 1998; List and
Lucking-Reiley 2002; Frey and Meier 2004; Allcott 2011). Our paper adds evidence that
the effects of social norms and reciprocity, which are found in different contexts of moral
behavior, also translate to moral behavior in the context of tax compliance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and
experimental variations. Section 3 presents the results with respect to the anatomy of tax
morale. The results of the randomized survey experiment are presented and discussed in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Survey and experimental treatments
The survey. We collected survey data through the German Internet Panel (GIP).
The GIP is a longitudinal survey that is operated and administered at the University
of Mannheim in Germany.10 GIP data are collected online on a bi-monthly basis. The
9Our survey-based approach to study attitudes towards tax evasion is also related to the literature
on attitudes towards redistribution which mainly uses survey questions to identify the drivers of redistri-
butional attitudes (examples for this literature include Luttmer 2001; Corneo and Gruener 2002; Fong
and Luttmer 2011). As we do in our study, this literature recently also implemented randomized survey
experiments to shed light on the drivers and elasticity of attitudes with respect to information (Cruces
et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Alesina et al. 2018).
10To be more precise, the survey is based at the ”Collaborative Research Center 884 on Political
Economy of Reforms”, which is funded by the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft, SFB 884). See http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/ for background information on
the research center. Also see the general survey description in Blom et al. (2015) and at http:
//reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_panel/home/. Examples of GIP-based papers include Ker-
schbamer and Mu¨ller (2017), Mu¨ller and Renes (2017), Dolls and Wehrhoefer (2018) and Engelmann
et al. (2018).
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survey is representative for the German population aged 16 to 75.11
The survey includes repeated questions (included in every wave) as well as questions
only included in single waves. We included the question on tax-compliance attitudes that
is at the center of this paper in wave 14 (the relevant question is numbered CF14015,
see Blom et al. 2016). This wave went to the field in November 2014 and included 3,575
participants. The data were released in 2016. For our analysis, we use wave 14 and
complement it with demographic information surveyed in previous waves.
Measurement of tax morale. Our measure of tax morale is based on the following
GIP question:
How justifiable do you think it is to evade taxes if a good opportunity to do so
presents itself?
Survey participants can reply to this question on a 6-point scale.12 We use a binary
version of the variable as the main outcome variable in our empirical analysis. The
recoded variable which we use takes value ”1” for respondents who find tax evasion
not at all justifiable, not justifiable or rather not justifiable and it takes value ”0” for
respondents who find tax evasion very justifiable, justifiable or rather justifiable. That is,
we create a dummy variable which indicates if a respondent has high tax morale (evasion
is more or less not justifiable) vs. low tax morale (evasion is more or less justifiable).
While this dummy variable allows for an intuitive and simple interpretation of the results,
we use the 6-point scale in a robustness check below.
The question is a slightly modified version of the commonly used question in the
WVS.13 As in the related WVS question, the question creates a hypothetical situation
in which taxpayers have an ’easy opportunity’ to evade and it does not ask participants
about their actual tax-compliance behavior. The hypothetical character of the question
ensures that participants will not fear any consequences from indicating that they find
evasion acceptable (as they maybe would if they were asked for actual evasion behavior)
11Recruitment was conducted oﬄine with face-to-face interviews, during which respondents were in-
vited to the online panel. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, the GIP includes respondents
without prior computer or Internet access by providing them with the necessary equipment and training.
12The reply categories were: very justifiable, justifiable, rather justifiable, rather not justifiable, not
justifiable and not at all justifiable. The original question in German was: Fuer wie vertretbar halten
Sie es, Steuern zu hinterziehen, wenn sich dafuer eine einfache Moeglichkeit ergibt? The original reply
categories were: fuer sehr vertetbar, fuer vertetbar, fuer eher vertetbar, fuer eher nicht vertetbar, fuer
nicht vertetbar and fuer ueberhaupt nicht vertetbar. The question and answers were designed by the
administrators of the survey who have an extensive and long-standing expertise in survey methodology
building on a similar question in the WVS (see below).
13The WVS question was for example used in Slemrod (2003), Alm and Torgler (2006), Richardson
(2006), Torgler (2006) and Halla (2012). It reads: Please tell me for the following statement whether
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you
have the chance’.
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and therefore triggers reliable answers which reflect the true intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes. Indeed, there is empirical work suggesting that replies to the equivalent question
in the WVS are associated with actual levels of tax evasion and the shadow economy
(Torgler and Schneider 2009; Halla 2012). Despite the usual potential problems with
survey questions, the hypothetical character of the question along with this empirical
evidence support the view that tax morale can be measured with this question.
Randomized survey experiment. Before replying to this survey question on tax
compliance, all participants were randomly assigned to three different groups in a between-
subjects design; ’control group’, ’social-norm group’ and ’reciprocity group’. Screenshots
of the three experimental conditions are displayed in Appendix Figures 2, 3 and 4. We
have an augmented treatment structure where we subsequently add information. That
is, participants in the social-norm group receive the same information as participants in
the control group plus additional information, and participants in the reciprocity group
receive the same information as participants in the social-norm group plus additional
information.
In the control group, the survey question was only preceded by a short opener
stating that cases of tax evasion are frequently discussed in the media. This opener
served the purpose of a short introduction to the question and a brief motivation for its
relevance. It also ensured that the tax compliance question does not come out of the
blue. Almost all questions in the GIP are preceded by a short comparable opener. 1,178
out of 3,532 participants were assigned to this control group.
In the social-norm group, the opening sentence in the control group was comple-
mented with a statement about the prevalence of tax evasion: Scientific studies estimate
that in industrialized countries approximately 10% of all taxes which the government is
entitled to are being evaded. By providing reliable information about the commonness
of tax evasion, these information are intended to manipulate the social norm of tax eva-
sion. Providing subjects with a number describing the commonness of a certain type
of behavior is the usual approach in the experimental literature for manipulating social
norms (e.g., Frey and Meier 2004).14 This social-norm treatment relates to the typology
of tax-morale mechanisms in Luttmer and Singhal (2014) who classify the ”views or be-
haviors of other individuals” as one important mechanism in this typology. The strength
of the social-norm manipulation depends on participants’ priors about the extent of tax
evasion; the larger the difference between the prior and the number presented in the
14One might also refer to this experimental manipulation as a ’social information treatment’, ’con-
ditional cooperation treatment’ or a ’descriptive norm treatment’. We use the wording ’social norm’
in line with previous literature that (randomly) provides information about the behavior of others to
manipulate ’social norms’ (e.g., Allcott 2011; Hallsworth et al. 2017). Our way of manipulating social
norms in the context of tax-paying behavior is comparable to one of the treatments in Hallsworth et al.
(2017) in which they communicate taxpayers that ’Nine out of ten people pay their tax on time’.
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treatment, the stronger is the shift in the social norm. Unfortunately, it was not feasible
to ask participants about their initial priors. Tax enforcement in Germany has a solid
reputation, suggesting that participants’ initial believe was that less than 10% of taxes
are evaded – but this is only speculation.
The most reliable information about the magnitude of the tax gap come from ran-
dom audit programs. These are rare and their results oftentimes not published. Unfortu-
nately, Germany does not conduct such randomized audit programs. The overview article
by Slemrod (2007) summarizes the available information about tax gaps estimated from
such randomized audit programs. The 2001 net tax gap in the US was estimated to be
16.3% of estimated actual (paid plus unpaid) tax liability. A European country with a
random audit program is Sweden, where the 1997 tax gap was estimated to be 9%. An
official document from the UK speculates that the UK tax gap is of similar magnitude
to that of Sweden and the United States (reported in Slemrod 2007). In light of these
information, we opted for providing the information that the tax gap in industrialized
countries is approximately 10%. Given the magnitudes of 16.3% for the US and 9% for
Sweden, 10% appears to be rather conservative, ensuring that we do not provide infor-
mation that are too extreme or deceptive in any way. 1,177 out of 3,532 participants
were assigned to this social-norm group.
Participants in the reciprocity group received the same information as partici-
pants in the social-norm group. In addition, they faced the following statement: With
these foregone earnings, the German government could raise its expenditures for educa-
tion by about 50 percent. This treatment highlighted that the extent of tax evasion has
implications for government budget and makes it salient to participants that tax evasion
potentially has immediate consequences for the provision of public goods through the gov-
ernment; the treatment hence reminds participants that beneficial government services
can only be provided in return for compliant tax payers.15 We chose education expen-
ditures as an example because this policy field is widely acknowledged to be important
and to create value; most people in Germany likely agree that higher education expenses
are better than lower education expenses (as for example reflected in the discussions in
basically all election campaigns). A large survey in Germany with more than 400.000
respondents (Zukunft durch Bildung 2011) shows that the vast majority finds education
to be ’extraordinary important’ and that 73% of the participants are willing to pay higher
taxes for the improvement of education in Germany.
The treatment reminds participants that more compliance could yield better policy
15This type of reciprocity statement is comparable to one of the treatments in the field experiment
by Bergolo et al. (2017). Subjects in their respective treatment are also told by how much government
expenses for particular ’good’ policies could increase if there was less evasion. As in Bergolo et al.
(2017), we do not intent to give the impression in our reciprocity treatment that all extra revenue from
less evasion is indeed spent on education. The treatment shall simply remind participants that evading
has significant implications for government spendings using education expenses as an illustrative example.
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in return, and thus appeals to the reciprocity of participants.16 The treatment indirectly
reminds participants that the ’implicit contract’ between the government and the citizens
(Feld and Frey 2007) – i.e., people pay taxes and receive government services in return –
is threatened through tax evasion. This treatment also relates to the typology of Luttmer
and Singhal (2014) which classifies reciprocity – defined as an additional utility term for
paying taxes honestly that depends in some way on the individual’s relationship to the
state – to be one of the key ingredients of tax morale. It was again not possible to
survey participants’ priors or whether they were (positively or negatively) surprised by
the treatment information. We speculate that most participants had not realized that
government services are potentially damaged through tax evasion to such a large extent,
suggesting that tax morale increases in response to the information treatment.
The information that government expenses for education could be increased by
about 50% if the tax-gap induced foregone earning were to be spent on education were
calculated as follows. Total tax revenues in 2013 amounted to about 620 billion Euro.17
A tax gap of 10% then implies that the foregone revenues due to the tax gap amounts
to about 69 billion Euro (tax gap = 0.1 = 69/(620 + 69)). According to the Federal
Statistical Office, the expenses for education in Germany in 2013 stood at 116 billion
Euro.18 These numbers then imply that education expenses would have increased by
59% (= 69/116) if all foregone revenues (69 billion) were to be spent on education. In
order to provide a conservative estimate and again insure ourselves against any type of
deception, we chose to give the information that education expenses could increase by
about 50%. 1177 out of 3532 overall participants were assigned to this reciprocity group.
A potential concern with most (survey) experiments is that experimenter effects
might drive some of the findings. In our context, this would imply that the treatment
changed respondents’ perception about what was appropriate to respond (desirability
bias), and their responses hence did not necessarily reflect their true and deep preferences.
We do not think that this is an important concern in our set-up. First, our experiment
is a between-subject design where every respondent is in either of the three groups.
That is, the experimental intervention is not made salient and respondents are not aware
that other respondents receive questions with different contents. As a result, they do
not realize that they are ought to give a particular answer. Second, the GIP surveys
16Fehr and Gaechter (2000, page 159) define reciprocity in their survey article as follows: ”Reciprocity
means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative
than predicted by the self-interest model.” Our reciprocity treatment stresses the mutual dependence of
tax compliance and government services and reminds people that they should be ”nice and cooperative”
(i.e., pay taxes) because the government does ”friendly actions” (i.e., provide education) in response to
cooperation and tax honesty.
17Source: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/FinanzenSteuern/Steuern/
Steuerhaushalt/SteuerhaushaltJ2140400137004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
18Source: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2014/02/
PD14_066_217.html
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general attitudes and opinions and does not give participants the impression that there
are correct or false replies. Third, even if there were experimenter effects – which we
think is not the case for the above reasons – the comparison of the social-norms treatment
and the reciprocity treatment would still be valid as it is very unlikely that the social-
norms treatment message induced very different experimenter effects than the reciprocity
treatment.
Variable description and summary statistics. Table 1 provides an overview of
all variables which we use throughout the paper (including measurement and category
information). Table 2 presents summary statistics for these variables. The table shows
that mean tax morale across all participants is at 0.89 (with standard deviation 0.32),
meaning that 89% of participants indicate that tax evasion is not at all/not/rather not
justifiable. Attrition is not an issue with the tax morale question; only about 1% of
respondents have a missing value for this question.
With regard to the other variables, Table 2 further shows that we have a balanced
share of men and women in the sample, 58% of all participants are married and the average
household of participants has 2.50 members. Age is only measured in categories (see table
1) and we see a roughly even distribution across the age categories (18% of participants are
younger than 30 and 24% are older than 60 years old). The share of retired participants is
16%, most participants are in income category 2 (40% with net household income between
1,500 and 3,000 Euro) and education category 3 (52% with high school with university
qualification or apprenticeship), and their political preferences are mostly conservative or
moderate left. In line with low unemployment rates in Germany, only 3% of people in
our sample are unemployed.
The GIP survey contains questions on risk attitudes and patience. The according
questions ask participants about their general willingness to take risks and their general
level of patience. This raises the natural question of whether these self-reported sur-
vey questions are a reliable predictor of actual behavior. Evidence in this direction for
the risk variable is provided by Dohmen et al. (2011) who compare survey questions
on self-reported risk with actual risk-taking behavior using a representative population
of the adult population in Germany. They elicit actual risk-taking behavior through
an incentivized real-stakes lottery experiment and their self-reported survey measure of
risk is very similar to the risk question in our GIP survey. Their results provide strong
evidence that the responses to the survey risk question are a strong predictor of actual
risk behavior, even controlling for a large number of observables.19 Vischer et al. (2013)
19The authors’ own conclusion is that these ”findings document that a simple, qualitative survey mea-
sure can generate a meaningful measure of risk attitudes, which maps into actual choices in lotteries with
real monetary consequences. This is important because it suggests that surveys can collect information
on risk attitudes using instruments that are easy to use and relatively cheap to administer, and yet deliver
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validate a self-reported patience question against actual behavior by. They use a similar
approach as Dohmen et al. (2011) and compare survey responses to actual behavior in
incentive-comparable inter-temporal choice experiments. They find that the survey re-
sponses indeed predict actual behavior. In addition, the Global Preference Survey (GPS),
a large cross-country survey to measure economic preferences, includes survey questions
on risk aversion and time discounting, which are carefully validated using incentivized
choice experiments (Falk et al. 2016; Falk et al. 2018). The questions in the GPS are
comparable to the GIP questions that we use to measure risk and patience – this is fur-
ther support that our survey questions are reliable measures for actual preferences with
respect to risk and patience.
We take the findings of these studies as reliable evidence that our survey responses
for risk attitudes and patience are appropriate measures for actual risk and patience
behavior. With regard to summary statistics for these two variables, Table 2 shows that
the average level of risk aversion is at 3.67 and average patience is at 3.48, both measured
on a 5-point scale.
Randomization checks. Table 3 presents the results of randomization checks. Fol-
lowing the strategy in Alesina et al. (2018), we test balance across groups as follows:
For each covariate, we run three OLS regressions of the form yi = βCovariatei + i,
where Covariate is the respective covariate that we test. The three dependent variables
for which we run the regressions are dummies indicating the treatment groups – control,
social norm, reciprocity. As a result of this procedure, we have the results of 24 OLS
regressions (one regression for each combination of 8 covariates and 3 outcome dummies).
Table 3 shows the p-values for these 24 regressions (robust standard errors). Over-
all, randomization worked very well. 7 out of 8 of the covariates cannot explain the
treatment-group status. We do see a significant effect of the unemployment variable on
the probability of belonging to the control and social-norm group. As the summary statis-
tics showed, the share of unemployed people in the sample is only 3% and we only have
a few unemployed individuals in each of the three treatment groups (19 unemployed in
control group, 41 in social-norm group and 32 in reciprocity group). This might explain
a potentially unlucky randomization with respect to this variable and also implies that
this variable is not a big concern. In addition, having some few variables that can explain
treatment status is not unusual and often the result of a true randomization process. For
example, around 5% of all presented randomization statistics are significant in Kleven
et al. (2011, section 6.1). We present 57 coefficients and find three significant effects
a behaviorally valid measure of risk attitudes” (Dohmen et al. 2011, page 524). The paper also studies
if particular risky activities, such as holding stocks, being self-employed or smoking, are correlated with
the survey question on risk attitudes. The results show that the general self-reported risk question is a
good all-round explanatory variable for predicting all behaviors.
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which also corresponds to a share of about 5% and backs the assertion that randomiza-
tion was successful. To circumvent any concerns with regard to randomization as good
as possible, we show regression results with and without conditioning on covariates.
3 Anatomy of tax morale
Table 4 shows the estimates of a simple OLS regression of our outcome variable – tax
morale – on different variables included in the survey. These estimates are conditional
correlations and should not be given a causal interpretation. However, they can shed
light on the drivers of tax morale, thereby complementing other studies based on field
experiments or tax-return data (which do not have information on many variables) and
adding to the large survey literature based on the WVS. In addition to using another
sample than the WVS, our survey has the advantage that we have a more precise measure
of income as well as two variables which are likely to matter for compliance that are not
included in the WVS: patience and risk aversion. The outcome variable is a binary
variable that takes value ”1” if evasion is not justifiable and value ”0” if evasion is
justifiable (see above). All variables are measured and coded as explained in Table 1.
Specification (I) includes basic demographic variables as explanatory variables.
These include gender, age, marital status, employment status, retirement status and
education level. We then subsequently add further variables to the regression.20 Specifi-
cation (II) adds a net-household-income measure, Specification (III) adds two variables
which reflect the character of a participant – risk aversion and patience – , and Spec-
ification (IV) adds political preferences. Specification (V) adds a categorical variable
indicating the treatment group from the randomized survey.
In accordance with most other studies,21 we find that women have higher tax morale
than men. The estimate for the gender dummy is highly significant and lies at around
-0.04, meaning that tax morale is about 4 percentage points lower for men relative to
women. This effect remains significant and around the same magnitude as we include
net income, risk and patience and political preferences as covariates. The literature on
the gender-wage gap finds that gender differences might partly be driven by risk aversion
(Bertrand 2011) and it might be the case that previously found gender effects in tax
morale are also driven by omitted risk aversion. However, this does not seem to be the
case: the gender difference in tax morale does not diminish once we condition on risk.22 It
20These variables have a slightly lower number of non-missing observations, which is why we add them
subsequently.
21Doerrenberg and Peichl (2013) briefly summarize the survey literature with respect to drivers of tax
morale.
22See the variable description in section 2 for a discussion on the reliability of our measure of risk
attitudes. With respect to average gender differences in risk, we indeed see in our data that women are
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is thus an insight adding to previous literature that the previously found gender difference
is not driven by risk aversion.23
A further strong driver of tax morale in our data is age; tax morale strongly increases
with age. For example, tax morale of individuals older than 59, as well as of individuals
between 50 and 59 years, is about 10-11 percentage points higher than for individuals
younger than 30. The respective effect for age groups 30-39 and 40-49, relative to being
younger than 30, is around 7 percentage points. These effects are all statistically signifi-
cant and they are not driven by variables that are correlated with age and also potentially
matter for tax morale; for example, neither retirement status, marital status, education
(specification I) nor income (II) considerably weaken the effect. Patience, risk aversion
(III) and political preferences (IV) do not diminish the age effect either. This finding is
in line with the survey literature and hence seems to be very robust.24 We further find
an effect of retirement on tax morale, yet only significant in specification (IV). Being
retired increases tax morale by about 4 percentage points – even conditional on age. The
effects of marital status, household size and employment status on tax morale are not
statistically significant. The effect of education loses significance as soon as income is
added to the regression (specifications I and II).
The effect of income (specification II) appears to be positive but is only statistically
significant for the medium-high income group (those with household net income between
3,000 and 5,000 Euro). Being in this income group increases tax morale by about 4 per-
centage points, relative to the poorest households (significant across all specifications).
The lack of significance for the other income groups might reflect the ambiguous theo-
retical effect of income on tax morale: Evasion yields higher returns for richer people,
but they also have higher societal stakes and are more affected by sanctions (i.e., loosing
a well paid job). The empirical picture from surveys is also ambiguous. Some studies
find insignificant effects (e.g., Konrad and Qari 2012 for Europe), while other studies find
negative effects (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006 for US and Europe).
Risk aversion and tax morale are positively correlated; participants with high risk
aversion are more likely to report higher tax morale. The magnitude of this effect is quite
sizable: participants in the 4th and 5th category of the risk-aversion variable (with 5
indicating the highest risk aversion) report a tax morale that is 10-11 percentage points
higher than for risk-loving participants (category 1).25 While this relationship is intuitive,
it has – to the best of our knowledge – not been clearly established in previous literature,
more risk averse; average risk aversion for women is at 3.9 and at 3.5 for men.
23For illustration purposes, we show the unconditional means for men and women in Appendix Figure
5.
24The unconditional means for the different age groups are depicted in Figure 6 in the Appendix for
illustration purposes.
25Figure 7 in the Appendix shows unconditional levels of tax morale by risk attitudes.
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probably due to reasons of data availability (tax morale and risk preferences are not
measured together).26
The effect of patience is positive in specification (III) but vanishes as political pref-
erences are included (IV). With regard to these political preferences, our regressions
reveal that tax morale is significantly lower among right-wing participants. The esti-
mates suggest that tax morale is about 9 percentage points lower for right-wingers than
for conservatives.
The results in specification (V) show that none of the above results are confounded
by the treatment information (i.e., adding a variable for the treatment group does not
change any of the described regression results).
4 Results of randomized survey experiment
Main results. The main results of the experimental variation on tax morale are pre-
sented in Figure 1 and Table 5. Figure 1 shows the average levels of tax morale in each
experimental group along with 95% confidence bands. Average tax morale is around 89%
in the control group, 87% in the social-norm group and 90% in the reciprocity group.
The p-values from pair-wise non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests
are as follows: control vs social norm: 0.165; control vs reciprocity: 0.256; social norm vs
reciprocity: 0.012. The social-norm treatment thus slightly decreased tax morale relative
to the control group. Adding the reciprocity component to the social-norm information
then significantly increases tax morale.
The non-parametric findings are mirrored in the OLS regressions shown in Table
5. Specification (I) is a simple regression of tax morale on the treatment indicators,
without the inclusion of any covariates. Not surprisingly, this regression simply reflects
the non-parametric differences in means. The p-value from a t-test that compares the
social-norm and reciprocity groups stands at 0.012 and is hence statistically significant.
In light of randomized variation, adding covariates does not change the treatment effects
by large magnitudes, though the differences partly become more significant; see spec-
ifications (II) to (V). Adding demographics to the regression (II) slightly increases the
difference between the control and social norm group (2.2% percentage points) and makes
it significant on the 10% level. The difference between groups social norm and reciprocity
is significant on the 1% level (p-value of 0.007) in this specification.
26The WVS in some waves includes a question about ’which things are most important if you were
looking for a job’. Answer category ’A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment’ is
sometimes used to construct a measure of risk which is then included as an explanatory variable in
tax-morale regressions (e.g., Torgler 2006). However, in light of the question’s focus on job search and
considering that even risk-averse people might prefer a safe job (many safe jobs are also very well paid,
for example civil servants), we are uncertain if this question really captures risk aversion.
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Measures for risk and patience as additional covariates (III) leave the coefficients and
significance levels unchanged. Specification (IV) adds household income as a covariate.
This reduces the number of observations (from about 3,500 to 2,875) and vanishes the sig-
nificance between the control and social-norm group. The difference between social-norm
and reciprocity remains significant at the 1% level. Specification (V) additionally condi-
tions on political preferences. This again reduces the number of observations (to about
2,230) and leaves the differences between the control group and the treatment groups
insignificant. The significance of the difference between the social-norm and reciprocity
groups becomes weaker but remains at the 10% level.
Discussion of main results. We find two main results: (i) information about the
general extent of tax evasion have a negative effect on tax morale, relative to the control
group (though not statistically significant in all regression specifications). (ii) If an appeal
to reciprocity is added to the social-norm information, tax morale becomes significantly
larger (significant effect of reciprocity relative to social norm) and even larger than in the
control group.
How can these results be rationalized? The effect of the social-norm treatment,
relative to control, suggests that manipulating the social norm of tax compliance through
the provision of information about the commonness of evasion affects tax morale. This
effect is in line with different strands of literature which find similar effects in different
contexts; for example late tax payments, public good provision, charitable giving and en-
ergy saving (see the Introduction for references and details). Individuals are most likely
very uncertain about the true extent of tax evasion. The negative effect of the tax-gap
information suggests that participants perceived the tax-gap numbers presented in the
information treatment to be considerably high (perceived initial tax evasion was unfor-
tunately not surveyed).27 So in line with for example Cialdini (2003), we confirm that a
social-norm manipulation can backfire when it reveals a certain behavior as regrettably
frequent. Simply speaking, the underlying mechanisms is something like ”if so many
others do it, it must be ok”.28
The positive effect of adding the reciprocity component to the social-norm informa-
tion (i.e., group reciprocity vs group social norm) suggests that a potential social-norm
backfire effect can be offset when the social-norm information are presented in a cer-
tain context and when the consequences of (not following) the social-norm are made
salient. Relating the information about the tax gap to information about foregone tax-
27Press coverage and anecdotal evidence tend to give the impression that tax evasion in Germany is
not as much of a concern as in other countries (see the whole debate about tax evasion in Greece in the
context of the Euro crisis).
28Or as phrased by Cialdini (2003): ”Within the statement ’Many people are doing this undesirable
thing’ lurks the powerful and undercutting normative message ’Many people are doing this’.”
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gap-induced government expenses makes participants realize that beneficial government
services can only be provided in return for compliant tax payers. In the words of Feld
and Frey (2007), the reciprocity component reminds participants of the ’implicit contract’
between the government and the citizens and that this contract is threatened through tax
evasion. The positive effect of the reciprocity treatment, relative to social-norm treat-
ment, is in line with studies in the literature finding that reciprocity matters for behavior
and that people are willing to give if they receive something in return (see Introduction
for references and examples).
The size of the treatment effects is around 2-3 percentage points. In light of an
average tax-morale level of 89%, this effect does not appear to be enormous. However,
tax morale is usually seen to be a ’deep’ parameter which is shaped over a lifetime by
experiences as a taxpayer, perceptions of and attitudes towards the government, culture
and social interaction with peers. This implies that it is likely to be fairly inelastic
and small interventions can hardly have large effects. Our experimental manipulation
consisted of only one or two additional sentences and was therefore fairly minor. In light
of these considerations, the experiment-induced changes in tax morale in our study might
be more important than it appears on first glance.29
Another way to assess the importance of the treatment effects is to consider the
inverse of tax morale as a benchmark; (1− TaxMorale) can be labeled as ’acceptance of
tax evasion’. Our data show that only 11% of participants find tax evasion acceptable.
Using this as the benchmark for assessing the magnitude of treatment effects in the range
of 2-3 percentage points sheds a different light on the importance of the results and lets
them appear quite sizable.
Heterogeneity of treatment effects. In a next step, we investigate if the experi-
mental interventions had differential effects on different type of participants. For this
purpose, we run OLS regressions of the following form separately for each covariate:
TMi = β1Treati + β2Covariatei + β3(Treati × Covariatei) + i. The outcome variable
TMi is tax morale of participant i, Treati indicates treatment dummies, Covariatei is a
covariate, and Treati × Covariatei is a full interaction between the treatment dummies
and the categories of the respective covariate.
The results are presented in table 6. For reasons of brevity, we do not report
the heterogeneous effect of each covariate (available upon request), but only for those
covariates where we find some significant heterogeneity. Again for brevity, the table
only reports the regression coefficients of the interaction terms, Treati × Covariatei.
29On a related note, Luttmer and Singhal (2014) stress that small or even null findings of some
field experiments might be due to the weak strength of the experimental manipulation and the ”deep”
attitudes that are behind compliance behavior. They argue that this should not necessarily be interpreted
as evidence that a certain mechanism cannot be powerful.
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The coefficients for Treati and Covariatei, as well as standard errors, are not reported
in the table (significance stars based on robust standard errors and the usual levels of
significance).
Overall, we do not find much heterogeneity of the treatments effects. As the table
shows, younger age groups respond stronger to the interventions than older age groups.
This might be due to lower average tax morale in the younger groups, implying that
there is more room for an increase in tax morale. We further find that married partici-
pants respond somewhat stronger to the social-norm treatment than unmarried ones. We
also find that participants living in large households respond stronger to the social-norm
treatment. These results might indicate that social norms have differential effects de-
pending on the social ties and environment of the participants. Household size also has
an effect on the response to the reciprocity treatment; the effect of reciprocity is more
negative for larger households. We find one heterogeneous effect of income; participants
in the third income group (net household income between 3,000 and 5,000 Euro) respond
more strongly to the social-norm treatment. If we use a binary version of the income-
group variable (with ’0’ for household incomes less than 3,000 Euro and ’1’ for more than
3,000 Euro), we see that the richer households respond stronger to both the social-norm
and reciprocity treatment (p-values of interaction terms: 0.003 and 0.060. Results not
reported in the regression table.)
In their randomized survey experiment on redistributive preferences, Alesina et al.
(2018) find heterogeneous effects with respect to political preferences. Accordingly, we
would expect that, for example, left-leaning respondents respond more to the reciprocity
treatment in our experiment because they have a higher preference for government spend-
ing. We indeed find that left-wing participants respond slightly more positive to the
reciprocity treatment (interaction coefficient of 0.076). This coefficient is just beyond
conventional significance though (p-value: 0.120). All other interactions of the treat-
ment indicators with the political categories are far from conventional significance levels.
Heterogeneity with respect to other (not reported) covariates are not significant either.
Robustness of main results. We used OLS regressions in all previous analyses. Table
7 presents the results from probit regressions with tax morale as the dependent variable
(the table is equivalent to the main OLS regression table 5, but using probit regressions).
The results are fully in line with the previous OLS regressions. We observe negative
coefficients for the social-norm treatment and positive coefficients for the reciprocity
group, both relative to the control group. As in the OLS regressions, these estimates
are only partly distinguishable from zero; in particular, the effect of social norms is
statistically significant in specifications (II) and (III) where covariates are added to the
regression specification. Importantly, the difference between the social-norm estimate
and the reciprocity estimate is statistically significant in all specifications – as indicated
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by the p-values for this difference which are reported in the table. That is, we observe
significantly higher tax morale in the reciprocity group relative to the social-norm group.
While we used a simple tax morale dummy as the outcome in all preceding regres-
sions, Table 8 presents ordered probit regressions using the 6-point scale version of the
tax morale question as the outcome variable (this is the equivalent to Table 7, but using
the 6-point scale outcome variable and ordered probit). The sign of the estimates is again
comparable to all previous estimates; negative estimate for social norms and positive es-
timate for reciprocity. However, we lose statistical precision; the social-norm treatment
is no longer significant in any of the specifications. The difference between the estimates
for social norms and reciprocity are statistically significant only in specifications (IV) and
(V) where we add a wide range of different covariates to the regression specification.
5 Concluding remarks
We study intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a randomized survey
experiment. We integrate a commonly used question on tax morale into a representative
survey in Germany and combine it with randomized information treatments. The first
contribution of our paper is to shed new light on the anatomy of intrinsic motivations. We
confirm earlier findings on the (correlational) effects of gender and age on tax morale. We
further show that these previous findings are not confounded by risk aversion or patience,
and find that risk aversion and tax morale are positively correlated. Participants with
right-wing political attitudes have lower tax morale.
In light of mixed findings in the literature on the role of social norms and reciprocity
for tax compliance, our main contribution is to provide new evidence on this role. To do
so, we conduct the first randomized survey experiment in the context of tax compliance.
Our customized survey experiment allows us to study social norms, reciprocity and their
interaction within the same experimental design. In our experimental interventions, we
(i) inform people about the extent of tax evasion in industrialized countries and (ii) make
it salient that the tax-evasion-induced foregone revenue has high consequences for the
provision of public goods through the government. That is, treatment (i) manipulates
the social norm of tax compliance and treatment (ii) adds a reciprocity component by
reminding participants that tax compliance and government services are closely linked.
We particularly find that the appeal to reciprocity increases tax morale, relative to the
social-norm treatment. In light of the usual perception that tax-morale attitudes are fairly
inelastic and considering the ’acceptance of tax evasion’ as a benchmark, the size of the
treatment effects appears fairly sizable. Our results have important policy implications.
Adding elements of reciprocity and highlighting the use of tax revenues might offer easy
opportunities for fighting tax evasion.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Tax Morale by Experimental Group
.8
4
.8
6
.8
8
.9
.9
2
Control Social Norm Educ Info
Mean Tax Morale by Treatment Group (with 95% Confidence Bands)
Tax Morale by Group
Notes: Average Tax Morale by experimental group with 95% confidence bars. The outcome variable is survey-based tax
morale as described in Section 2. Treatment groups as described in Section 2. Total number of observations is 3525 with
even distribution across experimental groups. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 1: Overview of variables
Variable Measurement Orig.
question
Tax Morale (1): Evasion is ’not at all justifiable’, ’not justifiable’ or
’rather not justifiable’; (0): Evasion is ’very justifiable’,
’justifiable’ or ’rather justifiable’
CF14015
Treatment
status
(1): Control; (2) Social norm; (3) Reciprocity expCF1401
Gender (1): Male; (0): Female gender 14
Age (1): < 30; (2): 30-39; (3): 40-49; (4): 50-59; (5): > 59 age cat 14
Marital Sta-
tus
(1): Married; (0): Not married marital
status 14
Household
size
(1): 1; (2) 2; (3) 3; (4): 4; (5): > 4 number
hh mem-
bers 14
Employment
status
(1): Unemployed; (0): Employed occupation
14
Retirement
Status
(1): Retired; (0): Not retired occupation
14
Household In-
come (net)
(1): 0-1500 Euro; (2) 1500-3000 Euro; (3) 3000-5000 Euro;
(4): > 5000
AA1305x
Risk Aversion Own risk perception measured on 11-point scale. We re-
code the variable to have 5 categories from (1) risk loving
to (5) risk averse
ZE14074
Patience Own perception of patience measured on 11-point scale.
We recode the variable to have 5 categories from (1) not
patient to (5) patient
AE14007
Political pref-
erence
(1): Conservative; (2): Moderate left; (3): Right wing; (4)
Left wing
CE14140
Education (1): no degree; (2) high school without university qual-
ification; (3) high school with university qualification or
apprenticeship combined with high school without univer-
sity qualification; (4): apprenticeship and high school de-
gree with university qualification; (5): University degree
or more
educ
school 14
Notes: Overview of all variables used throughout the paper. We list the question number in the original
GIP survey in the last column (Orig. question). All variables come from German Internet Panel (GIP)
wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable N mean sd min max p10 p50 p90
Tax morale 3525 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Control 3532 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Social norm 3532 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Reciprocity 3532 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Gender 3574 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Married 3575 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Retired 3575 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Unemployed 3575 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Household size 3571 2.54 1.13 1.00 5.00 1.00 2.00 4.00
Age < 30 3573 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age 30-39 3573 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age 40-49 3573 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age 50-59 3573 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Age > 60 3573 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conservative 2676 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Moderate left 2676 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Right wing 2676 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Left wing 2676 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Educ low 3574 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Educ low-med 3574 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Educ med 3574 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Educ high-med 3574 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Educ high 3574 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc low 2919 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc low-med 2919 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc med 2919 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Inc high 2919 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Risk aversion 3517 3.67 1.12 1.00 5.00 2.00 4.00 5.00
Patience 3516 3.48 1.24 1.00 5.00 2.00 4.00 5.00
Notes: Summary Statistics for all variables. All variables are defined as described in Table 1. Data
come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 3: Randomization checks
(I) (II) (III)
Dep. var.: Treatment Group Indicator
Variable Control Social Norm Reciprocity
Gender. Reference category: Female
Male 0.011 -0.010 0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age. Reference category: <30
30-39 -0.026 -0.007 0.036
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
40-49 -0.035 0.005 0.046*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
50-59 -0.012 0.002 0.022
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
>59 -0.016 0.004 0.027
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Marital status. Reference category: Not Married
Married -0.021 0.017 0.011
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Size of household. Reference category: 1
2 0.010 -0.028 0.015
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
3 -0.016 -0.022 0.039
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
4 -0.026 -0.004 0.022
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
>4 0.061 -0.058 -0.008
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Unemployment. Reference category: Employed
Unemployed -0.133*** 0.105** 0.008
(0.042) (0.051) (0.049)
Retirement Status. Reference category: Not Retired
Retired -0.033 0.017 0.021
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Education. Reference category: Low Education
2 0.059 -0.056 -0.010
(0.084) (0.088) (0.090)
3 0.064 -0.026 -0.052
(0.080) (0.085) (0.086)
4 0.043 0.012 -0.066
(0.082) (0.087) (0.088)
high educ 0.017 0.007 -0.034
(0.081) (0.086) (0.087)
Net household income. Reference category: Poor
2 -0.001 -0.009 0.013
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
3 0.015 -0.022 0.007
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
rich -0.048 0.002 0.050
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
Notes: Randomization checks. The table shows the coefficients and robust standard errors (in paren-
theses) from a series of regressions of the form yi = βCovariatei +i, where Covariate is the respective
variable that is listed. The dependent variables are dummies indicating the treatment groups. In Col-
umn (I), yi is ’1’ if participant i is in the control group and ’0’ otherwise. In Column (II), yi is ’1’
if participant i is in the social-norm group and ’0’ otherwise. In Column (III), yi is ’1’ if participant
i is in the reciprocity group and ’0’ otherwise. All covariates are defined as described in Table 1. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Data come from German Internet Panel
(GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 4: Anatomy of Tax Morale
Variable Dep. var.: Tax Morale
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Gender. Reference category: Female
Male -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Age. Reference category: <30
30-39 0.063*** 0.065** 0.061** 0.073** 0.072**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
40-49 0.075*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.076*** 0.074**
(0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
50-59 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.098*** 0.097***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
>59 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.097*** 0.096***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
Marital status. Reference category: Not Married
Married -0.001 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Size of household. Reference category: 1
2 -0.006 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
3 -0.029 -0.051** -0.050* -0.036 -0.038
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
4 -0.029 -0.045 -0.046* -0.049 -0.050
(0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
>4 -0.032 -0.050 -0.056 -0.048 -0.049
(0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.040)
Unemployment. Reference category: Employed
Unemployed -0.025 -0.031 -0.039 -0.045 -0.045
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.053)
Retirement Status. Reference category: Not Retired
Retired 0.012 0.030 0.029 0.035* 0.034*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Education. Reference category: Low Education
2 0.057 0.064 0.058 -0.048 -0.046
(0.077) (0.084) (0.082) (0.102) (0.102)
3 0.099 0.085 0.079 -0.014 -0.011
(0.074) (0.081) (0.078) (0.097) (0.097)
4 0.131* 0.126 0.118 0.014 0.019
(0.074) (0.082) (0.079) (0.098) (0.098)
high educ 0.145** 0.131 0.127 0.023 0.026
(0.074) (0.081) (0.079) (0.098) (0.098)
Net household income. Reference category: Poor
2 0.015 0.012 0.035 0.035
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
3 0.042* 0.041* 0.057** 0.057**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
rich 0.012 0.014 0.036 0.035
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032)
Risk aversion. Reference category: Risk loving
2 0.057 0.059 0.059
(0.050) (0.056) (0.056)
3 0.089* 0.093* 0.092*
(0.048) (0.054) (0.054)
4 0.117** 0.109** 0.108**
(0.048) (0.054) (0.054)
risk averse 0.107** 0.101* 0.101*
(0.048) (0.054) (0.054)
Patience. Reference category: Not patient
2 0.041 0.016 0.017
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
3 0.030 0.016 0.016
(0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
4 0.034 0.029 0.029
(0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
patient 0.070** 0.055 0.055
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
Political preferences. Reference category: Conservative
social 0.008 0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
right wing -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.028) (0.029)
left wing -0.007 -0.006
(0.024) (0.024)
Experimental Treatment Group. Reference category: Control
Social Norm -0.011
(0.016)
Educ Info 0.015
(0.015)
constant 0.732*** 0.717*** 0.589*** 0.703*** 0.701***
(0.078) (0.085) (0.096) (0.119) (0.121)
N 3519 2881 2875 2236 2236
R2 0.036 0.039 0.049 0.054 0.055
Notes: The table presents the determinants of Tax Morale. OLS Regressions of Tax Morale on various covariates.
Each column (I)-(V) presents the results of one regression with different sets of covariates. All variables are defined as
described in Table 1. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 5: Effect of experimental intervention on tax morale
Dependent variable: Tax Morale
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Experimental Group. Reference category: Control
Social Norm -0.019 -0.022* -0.022* -0.018 -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Reciprocity 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
constant 0.888*** 0.737*** 0.602*** 0.588*** 0.701***
(0.009) (0.078) (0.089) (0.097) (0.121)
p-val Norm vs Recipr. 0.012** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.096*
N 3525 3519 3498 2875 2236
R2 0.002 0.038 0.048 0.051 0.055
Demographics no yes yes yes yes
Risk & Patience no no yes yes yes
Household Income no no no yes yes
Political Preference no no no no yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on Tax Morale. OLS Regressions of
Tax Morale on treatment dummies. The experimental groups are: Control group, Social-norm group and Reciprocity
group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. Line p-val Norm vs Recipr.
presents the p-values from t-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Social-norm group is different from
the regression coefficient for the Reciprocity group. Columns (I)-(V) differ in the included sets of covariates. (I): no
covariates, (II): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (III):
(II) plus risk aversion and patience, (IV): (III) plus net household income, (V): (IV) plus political preferences. All
variables are defined as described in Table 1. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects of experimental interventions
Dep. var.: Tax Morale
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Age. Reference category: < 30
Norm × 30-39 0.115**
Norm × 40-49 0.097*
Norm × 50-59 0.061
Norm × > 59 0.031
Recipr. × 30-39 0.085*
Recipr. × 40-49 0.064
Recipr. × 50-59 0.010
Recipr. × > 59 0.020
Marital status. Reference category: Not married
Norm × Married 0.050*
Recipr. × Married 0.015
Size of Household.Reference category: 1
Norm × HHsize 2 -0.008
Norm × HHsize 3 -0.028
Norm × HHsize 4 -0.030
Norm × HHsize > 4 0.144**
Recipr. × HHsize 2 -0.067**
Recipr. × HHsize 3 -0.090**
Recipr. × HHsize 4 -0.091**
Recipr. × HHsize > 4 -0.047
Political preferences.Reference category: Conservative
Norm × social -0.008
Norm × right wing 0.029
Norm × left wing -0.020
Recipr. × social 0.003
Recipr. × right wing 0.029
Recipr. × left wing 0.076
Income Group.Reference category: 1
Norm × inc gr 2 -0.002
Norm × inc gr 3 0.107**
Norm × inc gr 4 0.025
Recipr. × inc gr 2 -0.070
Recipr. × inc gr 3 0.014
Recipr. × inc gr 4 -0.037
N 3523 3525 3522 2654 2886
R2 0.028 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.010
Notes: Heterogeneous effects of the experimental interventions. Reported are coefficients of OLS
regressions of the following form (which are estimated separately for each covariate): TMi =
β1Treati + β2Covariatei + β3(Treati ×Covariatei) + i. The outcome variable TMi is tax morale of
participant i, Treati indicates treatment dummies, Covariatei is a covariate, and Treati×Covariatei
is a full interaction between the treatment dummies and the categories of the respective covariate.
Specifications (I)-(V) present heterogeneous effects of different covariates. For reasons of brevity, esti-
mates for heterogeneous effects of additional covariates are not displayed if no significant interactions
found (available upon request). The treatment groups are: control, social-norm (Norm) and reciprocity
(Recipr.). All variables are defined as described in Table 1. Robust standard errors not displayed for
reasons of brevity. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Data come from
German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).30
Table 7: Robustness: Probit regressions
Dependent variable: Tax Morale
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Experimental Group. Reference category: Control
Social Norm -0.093 -0.115* -0.124* -0.095 -0.067
(0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.075) (0.088)
Reciprocity 0.079 0.077 0.079 0.129 0.098
(0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.079) (0.091)
constant -1.216*** -0.626** -0.051 0.002 -0.437
(0.048) (0.278) (0.320) (0.345) (0.518)
p-val Norm vs Recipr. 0.012** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.066*
N 3525 3519 3498 2875 2236
Demographics no yes yes yes yes
Risk & Patience no no yes yes yes
Household Income no no no yes yes
Political Preference no no no no yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on Tax Morale. Probit Regressions of
Tax Morale on treatment dummies. The experimental groups are: Control group, Social-norm group and Reciprocity
group. Control is omitted, implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. Line p-val Norm vs Recipr.
presents the p-values from chi-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Social-norm group is different
from the the regression coefficient for the Reciprocity group. Columns (I)-(V) differ in the included sets of covariates.
(I): no covariates, (II): gender, age, marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education,
(III): (II) plus risk aversion and patience, (IV): (III) plus net household income, (V): (IV) plus political preferences. All
variables are defined as described in Table 1; exception is tax morale which is measured on 6-point scale rather than a
dummy. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Data
come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Table 8: Robustness: Tax morale measured on 6pt scale, Ordered Probit regressions
Dependent variable: Tax Morale (6pt scale)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Experimental Group. Reference category: Control
Social Norm -0.027 -0.039 -0.037 -0.053 -0.017
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.058)
Reciprocity 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.042 0.080
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.057)
constant 0.158*** 0.627*** 1.040*** 1.044*** 1.051***
(0.034) (0.231) (0.265) (0.284) (0.379)
p-val Norm vs Recipr. 0.365 0.281 0.251 0.057* 0.088*
N 3525 3519 3498 2875 2236
Demographics no yes yes yes yes
Risk & Patience no no yes yes yes
Household Income no no no yes yes
Political Preference no no no no yes
Notes: The table presents the effects of the randomized treatment interventions on Tax Morale. Ordered Probit Regres-
sions of Tax Morale on treatment dummies. Tax morale is measured on a 6-point scale using all reply categories from
the survey. The experimental groups are: Control group, Social-norm group and Reciprocity group. Control is omitted,
implying that the effects are relative to the Control Group. Line p-val Norm vs Recipr. presents the p-values from
chi-tests which compare if the regression coefficient for the Social-norm group is different from the regression coefficient
for the Reciprocity group. Columns (I)-(V) differ in the included sets of covariates. (I): no covariates, (II): gender, age,
marital status, household size, employment status, retirement status, and education, (III): (II) plus risk aversion and
patience, (IV): (III) plus net household income, (V): (IV) plus political preferences. All variables are defined as described
in Table 1. Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Appendix
Additional Figures
Figure 2: Screenshot of survey experiment: control group
Notes: The figure shows a screenshot of the survey question which is used to measure tax morale. This screenshot shows
the screen which is shown to participants in the experimental control group. See section 2 for a description of the survey
and the randomized survey experiment. German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 14. Sources: http://reforms.uni-mannheim.
de/internet_panel/Questionnaires/ and (Blom et al. 2016).
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Figure 3: Screenshot of survey experiment: social-norm group
Notes: The figure shows a screenshot of the survey question which is used to measure tax morale. This screenshot shows the
screen which is shown to participants in the experimental social-norm group. See section 2 for a description of the survey
and the randomized survey experiment. German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 14. Sources: http://reforms.uni-mannheim.
de/internet_panel/Questionnaires/ and (Blom et al. 2016).
Figure 4: Screenshot of survey experiment: reciprocity group
Notes: The figure shows a screenshot of the survey question which is used to measure tax morale. This screenshot shows
the screen which is shown to participants in the experimental reciprocity group. See section 2 for a description of the survey
and the randomized survey experiment. German Internet Panel (GIP), wave 14. Sources: http://reforms.uni-mannheim.
de/internet_panel/Questionnaires/ and (Blom et al. 2016).
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Figure 5: Tax Morale by Gender
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Notes: Average Tax Morale by gender. The outcome variable is survey-based tax morale as described in Section 2. Total
number of observations is 3525. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Figure 6: Tax Morale by Age Categories
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Notes: Average Tax Morale by age categories. The outcome variable is survey-based tax morale as described in Section 2.
Total number of observations is 3525. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
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Figure 7: Tax Morale by Risk attitudes
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Notes: Average Tax Morale by risk categories. The outcome variable is survey-based tax morale as described in Section 2.
Total number of observations is 3525. Data come from German Internet Panel (GIP) wave 14 (Blom et al. 2016).
37
